Equilibrium Financing in a Distribution Channel with Capital Constraint
Equilibrium Financing in a Distribution Channel with Capital Constraint
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资本约束下分销渠道的均衡融资
DOI：
10.1111/j.1937-5956.2012.01328.x
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发表时间：
2012-11-01
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
Cai, Gangshu (George)
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jing, Bing;Chen, Xiangfeng;Cai, Gangshu (George)
在许多分销渠道中都存在着资本约束。我们研究了一个由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的渠道，其中零售商是资金受限的。零售商可以通过从竞争激烈的银行市场或制造商那里借入信贷来为其业务提供资金，前提是后者愿意放贷。当只有一种信贷类型(银行或贸易信贷)可行时，我们发现贸易信贷融资通常收取更高的批发价，因此对零售商来说变得不那么有吸引力。当银行和贸易信贷都可行时，当生产成本相对较低时，唯一的均衡是贸易信贷融资，否则就是银行信贷融资。我们还研究了零售商和制造商都受到资金约束的情况，证明了为了提高整体供应链效率，银行应该在生产成本较低的情况下为制造商提供资金，而在其他情况下为零售商提供资金。我们的分析进一步表明，随着需求变化或零售商内部资本水平的增加，贸易信贷融资的均衡区域缩小。
There exist capital constraints in many distribution channels. We examine a channel consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer, where the retailer is capital constrained. The retailer may fund its business by borrowing credit either from a competitive bank market or from the manufacturer, provided the latter is willing to lend. When only one credit type (either bank or trade credit) is viable, we show that trade credit financing generally charges a higher wholesale price and thus becomes less attractive than bank credit financing for the retailer. When both bank and trade credits are viable, the unique equilibrium is trade credit financing if production cost is relatively low but is bank credit financing otherwise. We also study the case where both the retailer and the manufacturer are capital constrained and demonstrate that, to improve the overall supply chain efficiency, the bank should finance the manufacturer if production cost is low but finance the retailer otherwise. Our analysis further suggests that the equilibrium region of trade credit financing shrinks as demand variability or the retailer's internal capital level increases.