Creating an arms control mechanism in North East Asia: the application of the European security co-operation regime
Creating an arms control mechanism in North East Asia: the application of the European security co-operation regime
复制标题
建立东北亚军控机制:欧洲安全合作机制的应用
DOI:
10.1080/1475179042000195492
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发表时间:
2004
期刊:
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Michael Sheehan
中科院分区:
文献类型:
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作者:
Michael Sheehan
North East Asia has long been thought of as an appropriate region for the application of the kinds of arms control and confidence-building measures developed for Europe during the latter stages of the Cold War. There are important differences between the two cases, notably the bloc-to-bloc character of the European negotiations, but nevertheless there are enough similarities to make comparison inevitable. Korea, like Cold War Europe, is divided by an iron curtain separating two heavily armed ideological rivals. South Korea is an ally of the United States, which maintains considerable forces on her territory, and in nearby Japan. However, until recently, a crucial difference between the two situations has been that the breakthroughs in Europe began during a period of relative détente, whereas the Korean peninsula has been characterized by a depth of hostility and suspicion more characteristic of Europe in the early 1950s, and the relationships between China and Taiwan, South Korea and Japan, and Japan and Russia are marked by significant territorial disputes. Both Japan and China have been energetically modernizing their armed forces because of their perception of the uncertain regional security environment. North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and its development of the Rodong and Daepodong intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM) have also contributed to a sense of regional instability. So too did the 1999 clash between North and South Korean naval units in which a North Korean warship was sunk and several others seriously damaged.1 Moreover, in 2002 the simmering nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula re-emerged when North Korea expelled IAEA inspectors monitoring the Yongbyon nuclear complex2 and seemed to suggest a desire to resume a plutoniumproducing process free from international scrutiny, triggering a confrontation with the Defense & Security Analysis Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 39–54, March 2004