Growth and trustified capitalism
Growth and trustified capitalism
复制标题
增长和可信资本主义
DOI：
10.1016/0304-3932(94)90028-0
复制
发表时间：
1994
影响因子：
4.1
通讯作者：
Douglas G. Waldo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
P. Thompson;Douglas G. Waldo
以前的质量改进模型集中在熊彼特所谓的“竞争资本主义”上。创新的公司会把竞争对手赶出市场。在本文中，一个模型，抓住熊彼特的概念的重要方面的“受托资本主义”的发展。创新企业从竞争对手那里夺取市场份额，但不会把他们赶出市场。早期模型的大多数结果都能继续下去。例如，质量增长率的决定因素与以前的模型完全相同。然而，确实出现了两个差异。与以前的模式不同，质量增长是通过研发规模收益递减来保证的。同样与以前的模型不同的是，该模型的公平增长率明显低于社会最优增长率。缺乏模糊性的原因是，当创新企业只占领竞争对手的部分市场份额时，负面的利润破坏外部性被削弱了。
Previous models of quality improvements focus on what Schumpeter called ‘competitive capitalism’. Innovating firms drive their rivals out of business. In this paper, a model which captures important aspects of Schumpeter's notion of ‘trustified capitalism’ is developed. Innovating firms capture market share from their rivals but do not drive them out of business. Most of the results of earlier models carry over. For example, the determinants of the growth rate of quality are exactly the same as in previous models. However, two differences do arise. In contrast to previous models, quality growth is guaranteed by diminishing returns to scale in R&D. Also in contrast to previous models, thelaissez fairegrowth rate is unambiguously below the socially optimal growth rate. The lack of ambiguity occurs because the negative profit destruction externality is weakened when innovating firms capture only part of their rivals's market share.