BUSINESS AND WELFARE STATE DEVELOPMENT Why Did Employers Accept Social Reforms?

BUSINESS AND WELFARE STATE DEVELOPMENT Why Did Employers Accept Social Reforms?
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DOI:
10.1017/s0043887113000117
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发表时间:
2013-07-01
期刊:
影响因子:
5
通讯作者:
Paster, Thomas
Paster, Thomas
中科院分区:
法学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Paster, Thomas

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近年来,以雇主为中心的福利国家发展的解释已经开始挑战传统的以劳动力为中心和以国家为中心的解释。这些新的解释表明,特定部门的商业利益和跨阶级联盟推动了社会项目的采用和扩展(商业利益命题)。本文提出了一个新的解释的差异,企业支持福利国家扩张的基础上,德国的案例和瑞典和美国的影子案例研究的历时性分析。文章认为,在考察雇主的立场在不同时期而非不同行业的变化时,政治制约因素是解释雇主对社会改革支持度变化的核心因素(政治适应论)。本文确定了两个目标的商业干预福利国家的发展:安抚和遏制。在绥靖政策中,商业利益推动了社会政策的扩张;在遏制政策中,商业利益限制了社会政策的扩张。当革命力量挑战资本主义,政治稳定因此成为优先事项时,商业选择了绥靖政策。当改革派力量似乎有可能成功地扩大社会保障,而且不存在革命性挑战时,企业就会选择遏制。本文表明,随着时间的推移,在类型的政治挑战,企业利益面临的最好的解释,在企业支持劳动友好型社会改革的变化。
In recent years, employer-centered explanations of welfare state development have begun to challenge conventional labor-centered and state-centered explanations. These new explanations suggest that sector-specific business interests and cross-class alliances propelled the adoption and expansion of social programs (the business interests thesis). This article presents a novel explanation of differences in business support for welfare state expansion based on a diachronic analysis of the German case and shadow case studies of Sweden and the United States. The article suggests that when looking at changes in employers’ positions across time rather than across sectors, political constraints turn out to be the central factor explaining variation in employers’ support for social reforms (the political accommodation thesis). The article identifies two goals of business intervention in welfare state development: pacification and containment. In the case of pacification, business interests propel social policy expansion; in the case of containment, they constrain it. Business chooses pacification when revolutionary forces challenge capitalism and political stabilization thus becomes a priority. Business chooses containment when reformist forces appear likely to succeed in expanding social protection and no revolutionary challenge exists. The article shows that changes over time in the type of political challenges that business interests confront best explain the variation in business support for labor-friendly social reforms.