Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule
Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2720705
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发表时间：
2008-11
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
M. Umezawa
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Umezawa
本文研究了将偏好概况映射到备选方案集合的社会选择对应的联盟策略证明性。特别是，我们关注帕累托规则，该规则将帕累托最优选择集与每个偏好配置文件联系起来，并检查联盟策略验证性和帕累托最优性之间是否存在必要的联系。在极大极小准则的基础上给出了联盟策略抗扰性的定义。我们证明了帕累托规则在这个意义上是联合策略证明的。此外，我们证明了给定一个满足联盟策略抗性和非强制性的任意社会选择对应，该对应所选择的所有方案都是帕累托最优的。这两个结果表明，帕累托规则是联盟策略证明和非强加社会选择对应类中的最大对应。
This paper studies coalitional strategy-proofness of social choice correspondences that map preference profiles into sets of alternatives. In particular, we focus on the Pareto rule, which associates the set of Pareto optimal alternatives with each preference profile, and examine whether or not there is a necessary connection between coalitional strategy-proofness and Pareto optimality. The definition of coalitional strategy-proofness is given on the basis of a max–min criterion. We show that the Pareto rule is coalitionally strategy-proof in this sense. Moreover, we prove that given an arbitrary social choice correspondence satisfying the coalitional strategy-proofness and nonimposition, all alternatives selected by the correspondence are Pareto optimal. These two results imply that the Pareto rule is the maximal correspondence in the class of coalitionally strategy-proof and nonimposed social choice correspondences.