Evidence on differences between Recognition and Disclosure: A Comparison of Inputs to Estimate Fair Values of Employee Stock Options

Evidence on differences between Recognition and Disclosure: A Comparison of Inputs to Estimate Fair Values of Employee Stock Options
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承认与披露之间差异的证据:估计员工股票期权公允价值的输入比较

DOI:
10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.09.004
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发表时间:
2011
影响因子:
5.9
通讯作者:
P. Choudhary
P. Choudhary
中科院分区:
管理学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
P. Choudhary

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我调查了确认和披露制度之间的可靠性差异,以揭示员工股票期权(ESO)公允价值的不同激励和报告。我比较股票期权的公平价值的基础上,公司报告的输入与股票期权的公平价值的基础上,基准输入,估计以下权威的指导。平均而言,我发现与披露相比,机会主义随着承认而增加,并且它与管理收益的激励有关。尽管机会主义的增加,我发现,识别的准确性并没有下降,并且在自愿和强制性识别的准确性不同。
I investigate reliability differences across recognition and disclosure regimes to shed light on differing incentives and reporting of employee stock option (ESO) fair values. I compare ESO fair values based on firm-reported inputs with ESO fair values based on benchmark inputs, estimated following authoritative guidance. On average, I find opportunism increases with recognition as compared with disclosure, and that it is associated with incentives to manage earnings. Despite the increase in opportunism, I find that accuracy does not decline for recognizers, and that accuracy differs across voluntary and mandatory recognition.
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.247435
发表时间: 1999-03
期刊: Financial Accounting
影响因子: --
作者:
Eli Bartov;Dan Givoly;Carla K. Hayn
通讯作者: Eli Bartov;Dan Givoly;Carla K. Hayn