Effective Topology Tampering Attacks and Defenses in Software-Defined Networks
Effective Topology Tampering Attacks and Defenses in Software-Defined Networks
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DOI：
10.1109/dsn.2018.00047
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发表时间：
2018-06
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
R. Skowyra;Lei Xu;G. Gu;V. Dedhia;Thomas Hobson;Hamed Okhravi;James Landry
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
R. Skowyra;Lei Xu;G. Gu;V. Dedhia;Thomas Hobson;Hamed Okhravi;James Landry
随着软件定义的网络的越来越重要，已经证明了新的攻击可能会破坏SDN控制器对网络拓扑的看法。这些拓扑中毒攻击，尤其是宿主地点劫持和链接制造攻击，使对手能够模仿最终主机或间接间链接，以监视，损坏或放下网络流。作为回应，已经开发了防御措施来检测此类攻击并提高警报。在本文中，我们分析了两个这样的防御措施，即拓扑和狮身人面像，并提出了两次新攻击，港口探测和失忆症，可以成功绕过它们。然后，我们开发并提出扩展到Topoguard，以使其对此类攻击有弹性。
As Software-Defined Networking has gained increasing prominence, new attacks have been demonstrated which can corrupt the SDN controller's view of network topology. These topology poisoning attacks, most notably host-location hijacking and link fabrication attacks, enable adversaries to impersonate end-hosts or inter-switch links in order to monitor, corrupt, or drop network flows. In response, defenses have been developed to detect such attacks and raise an alert. In this paper, we analyze two such defenses, TopoGuard and Sphinx, and present two new attacks, Port Probing and Port Amnesia, that can successfully bypass them. We then develop and present extensions to TopoGuard to make it resilient to such attacks.