Authentication Capacity of Adversarial Channels
Authentication Capacity of Adversarial Channels
复制标题
对抗通道的认证能力
DOI：
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发表时间：
2018
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Kliewer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
O. Kosut;J. Kliewer
在对抗性点对点通道中考虑无密钥认证。也就是说，合法的发射机和接收机旨在通过噪声信道进行通信，该噪声信道可能包含也可能不包含能够将任意信号发送到信道中的活跃对手。如果对手不存在，那么接收器必须以高概率成功解码消息;如果对手存在，那么接收器必须解码消息或检测对手的存在。因此，每当接收器解码时，可以确定解码的消息是真实的。精确的认证能力的特点是离散无记忆对手的渠道，对手被假定为知道的代码，但不是消息。的认证能力被证明是零或等于无对手的能力，这取决于是否满足条件的通道被称为重写。
Keyless authentication is considered in an adversarial point-to-point channel. Namely, a legitimate transmitter and receiver aim to communicate over a noisy channel that may or may not also contain an active adversary, capable of transmitting an arbitrary signal into the channel. If the adversary is not present, then the receiver must successfully decode the message with high probability; if it is present, then the receiver must either decode the message or detect the adversary’s presence. Thus, whenever the receiver decodes, it can be certain that the decoded message is authentic. The exact authentication capacity is characterized for discrete-memoryless adversary channels, where the adversary is assumed to know the code but not the message. The authentication capacity is shown to be either zero or equal to the no-adversary capacity, depending on whether the channel satisfies a condition termed overwritability.
具有认证要求的噪声信道容量区域的内界
DOI：
10.1109/isit.2018.8437595
发表时间：
2018
期刊：
IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory
影响因子：
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作者：
Perazzone, Jake;Graves, Eric;Yu, Paul;Blum, Rick
通讯作者：
Blum, Rick