The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors
The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors
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机构投资者的代理问题
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2982617
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
S. Hirst
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
L. Bebchuk;Alma Cohen;S. Hirst
长期以来，金融经济学和公司治理一直关注大型上市公司所有权分散导致的公司经理和股东之间的代理问题。在本文中，我们将重点关注机构投资者在过去几十年中的崛起如何改变了企业的面貌，进而改变了现代公司的治理问题。机构投资者的兴起导致股权更加集中，现在大多数公共公司的大部分股份由少数机构投资者持有。与此同时，这些机构由投资经理控制，而投资经理对自己的受益投资者也有自己的代理问题。我们开发了一个分析框架来理解机构投资者的代理问题，并将其应用于研究几种主要类型的投资经理的代理问题和行为，包括那些管理共同基金（包括指数基金和积极管理基金）和激进对冲基金。我们发现，指数基金特别差的激励措施，从事管理活动，可以改善治理和增加价值。积极型对冲基金的激励机制远优于指数基金或积极型共同基金的经理。虽然他们的活动可能会部分补偿，我们表明，他们不提供一个完整的解决方案，其他机构投资者的代理问题。
Financial economics and corporate governance have long focused on the agency problems between corporate managers and shareholders that result from the dispersion of ownership in large publicly traded corporations. In this paper, we focus on how the rise of institutional investors over the past several decades has transformed the corporate landscape and, in turn, the governance problems of the modern corporation. The rise of institutional investors has led to increased concentration of equity ownership, with most public corporations now having a substantial proportion of their shares held by a small number of institutional investors. At the same time, these institutions are controlled by investment managers, which have their own agency problems vis-a-vis their own beneficial investors. We develop an analytical framework for understanding the agency problems of institutional investors, and apply it to examine the agency problems and behavior of several key types of investment managers, including those that manage mutual funds—both index funds and actively managed funds—and activist hedge funds. We show that index funds have especially poor incentives to engage in stewardship activities that could improve governance and increase value. Activist hedge funds have substantially better incentives than managers of index funds or active mutual funds. While their activities may partially compensate, we show that they do not provide a complete solution for the agency problems of other institutional investors.