Finite-key-size effect in a commercial plug-and-play QKD system
Finite-key-size effect in a commercial plug-and-play QKD system
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DOI：
10.1088/2058-9565/aa804b
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发表时间：
2017-12-01
影响因子：
6.7
通讯作者：
Makarov, Vadim
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Chaiwongkhot, Poompong;Sajeed, Shihan;Makarov, Vadim
针对有限密钥大小效应，对一个商用即插即用量子密钥分发（QKD）系统进行了安全评估。我们证明了窃听者的能力，迫使系统从一个较小长度的筛选密钥提取密钥。我们还推导出一个键速率方程，这是特定于这个系统。该等式提供了在有限密钥大小分析下安全密钥的上界以上的界。从这个方程和我们的实验数据中，我们表明，已从较小的筛选密钥大小的密钥超过我们的界限。因此，它们的安全性不受有限密钥大小分析的影响。在实验中，我们可以始终迫使系统在边界之外生成密钥。我们还测试制造商的软件更新。虽然补丁后的所有密钥都在我们的范围内，但在这种分析下，它们的安全性无法得到保证。该方法可用于QKD系统的安全认证和标准化。
A security evaluation against the finite-key-size effect was performed for a commercial plug-and-play quantum key distribution (QKD) system. We demonstrate the ability of an eavesdropper to force the system to distill key from a smaller length of sifted-key. We also derive a key-rate equation that is specific for this system. This equation provides bounds above the upper bound of secure key under finite-key-size analysis. From this equation and our experimental data, we show that the keys that have been distilled from the smaller sifted-key size fall above our bound. Thus, their security is not covered by finite-key-size analysis. Experimentally, we could consistently force the system to generate the key outside of the bound. Wealso test manufacturer's software update. Although all the keys after the patch fall under our bound, their security cannot be guaranteed under this analysis. Our methodology can be used for security certification and standardization of QKD systems.