Is Persuasive Advertising Always Combative in a Distribution Channel?
Is Persuasive Advertising Always Combative in a Distribution Channel?
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DOI：
10.1287/mksc.1090.0528
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发表时间：
2009-11
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Chi-Cheng Wu;Ying‐ju Chen;Chih-Jen Wang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Chi-Cheng Wu;Ying‐ju Chen;Chih-Jen Wang
现有的市场营销文献表明，说服性广告消除了竞争制造商的反作用，从而导致广告效果的浪费性抵消。因此，说服性广告被广泛认为是好斗的性质。一系列先前发表的论文表明，适当的目标可以部分减轻说服性广告的好斗性质，无论是竞争对手的制造商或零售商可能会受益。在本文中，我们通过证明每个渠道成员都可以从说服性广告中受益的可能性来补充他们的结果，即，一个帕累托改进沿着分销渠道，从而导致的结论，说服性广告不一定会导致渠道冲突。
The existing marketing literature suggests that persuasive advertising elicits counteractions from competing manufacturers and consequently leads to wasteful cancellation of the advertising effects. Thus, persuasive advertising is widely perceived to be combative in nature. A series of previously published papers demonstrates that appropriate targeting may partially mitigate the combative nature of persuasive advertising in that either the rival manufacturer or the retailer may benefit. In this paper, we complement their results by demonstrating the possibility that every channel member may benefit from persuasive advertising, i.e., a Pareto improvement along the distribution channel, thereby leading to the conclusion that persuasive advertising need not result in channel conflict.