Marr and Reductionism
Marr and Reductionism
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DOI：
10.1111/tops.12134
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发表时间：
2015-04-01
影响因子：
3
通讯作者：
Bickle, John
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Bickle, John
大卫马尔的三个层次的方法完全理解认知系统和他重视的计算水平是如此熟悉，几乎不需要重复。似乎很少有人认识到，马尔通过批评还原论方法来捍卫他的著名方法。这在马尔和还原论之间建立了一种比通常所承认的更有趣的关系。我认为，马尔是正确的，在他的批评还原论者，他的时间，他们只是描述（细胞活动），而不是解释（认知功能）。但是，对过去20年来还原论神经科学的元科学研究表明，马尔的批评不再具有说服力。当代神经科学现在直接解释认知，尽管在流行的机械论上与马尔推荐的有很大的不同。因此，虽然马尔正确地拒绝了他那个时代的还原论，并提供了一种真正解释认知的替代方法，但当代认知科学家现在需要为马尔的著名方法及其解释的优势进行新的辩护，而这种解释在当前还原论神经科学中已经成功地实现了。有一些熟悉的理由认为，这笔债务不会轻易偿还。
David Marr's three-level method for completely understanding a cognitive system and the importance he attaches to the computational level are so familiar as to scarcely need repeating. Fewer seem to recognize that Marr defends his famous method by criticizing the reductionistic approach. This sets up a more interesting relationship between Marr and reductionism than is usually acknowledged. I argue that Marr was correct in his criticism of the reductionists of his timethey were only describing (cellular activity), not explaining (cognitive functions). But a careful metascientific account of reductionistic neuroscience over the past two decades reveals that Marr's criticisms no longer have force. Contemporary neuroscience now explains cognition directly, although in a fashioncausal-mechanisticallyquite different than Marr recommended. So while Marr was correct to reject the reductionism of his day and offer an alternative method for genuinely explaining cognition, contemporary cognitive scientists now owe us a new defense of Marr's famous method and the advantages of its explanations over the type now pursued successfully in current reductionist neuroscience. There are familiar reasons for thinking that this debt will not be paid easily.