Enactive theorists do it on purpose: Toward an enactive account of goals and goal-directedness
Enactive theorists do it on purpose: Toward an enactive account of goals and goal-directedness
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积极的理论家是有目的地这样做的：对目标和目标导向性进行积极的解释
DOI：
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发表时间：
2007
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
M. McGann
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
M. McGann
认知科学的积极方法涉及频繁提及“行动”，但没有明确该术语的含义。特别是，尽管自创生在生成文献中被视为目的论的基础，但没有提供目标的定义或说明，这些目标不仅包含生物维持的描述，还包含人类不断参与的社会和文化活动的范围。本文主要借鉴了 Juarrero（《行动中的动力学》。剑桥，马萨诸塞州：麻省理工学院出版社，1999）和 Donald（《现代思维的起源》。伦敦：Wiedenfeld & Nicolson，1991）的工作，试图提供关于目标和目标导向性的大致轮廓，这与主动方法一致，并解释了人类表现出的几种形式的目标导向性。对唐纳德描述的认知进化的四个阶段进行了适应性和目标导向性特征机制的检查。讨论了意义的生成理论的含义。
The enactive approach to cognitive science involves frequent references to “action” without making clear what is intended by the term. In particular, though autopoiesis is seen as a foundation for teleology in the enactive literature, no definition or account is offered of goals which can encompass not just descriptions of biological maintenance, but the range of social and cultural activities in which human beings continually engage. The present paper draws primarily on the work of Juarrero (Dynamics in action. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999) and Donald (Origins of the modern mind. London: Wiedenfeld & Nicolson, 1991) in an attempt to offer the broad outlines of an account of goals and goal-directedness which is consistent with the enactive approach and which explicates several forms of goal-directedness exhibited by human beings. Four stages of cognitive evolution described by Donald are examined for characteristic mechanisms of adaptivity and goal-directedness. Implications for an enactive theory of meaning are discussed.