“Agency” as a Red Herring in Social Theory
“Agency” as a Red Herring in Social Theory
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“代理”作为社会理论中的转移注意力
DOI：
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发表时间：
2001
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
B. Barnes
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Steven Loyal;B. Barnes
这篇文章的中心论点是，没有事实，没有证据，无论多么试探性或可疑，将充分地为社会学理论的目的确定“选择”或“决定”的行为。这一论点将参考两位在倡导代理概念的社会学价值方面最重要的理论家：塔尔科特·帕森斯（Talcott Parsons），他的“行动唯意志论”（voluntaristic theory of action）为现代社会学中的整个代理和结构辩论奠定了基础，安东尼·吉登斯（Anthony Giddens）在他的结构理论中提供了最近最全面的解释。两位理论家都为他们使用“选择”和“代理”的概念提出了依据和理由，但在最后的分析中，这里要争论的是，他们都没有任何社会学价值。
The central argument of this article is that there is no fact of the matter, no evidence, however tentative or questionable, that will serve adequately to identify actions “chosen” or “determined” for the purposes of sociological theory. This argument will be developed with reference to the two theorists of the greatest importance in advocating the sociological value of the concept of agency: Talcott Parsons, with his “voluntaristic theory of action,” set the scene for the whole agency and structure debate in modern sociology, and Anthony Giddens, in his theory of structuration, provides the most comprehensive recent account. Both theorists put forward grounds and justifications for their use of the concepts of “choice” and “agency,” but it will be argued here that in the last analysis, none of them has any sociological merit.