Inappropriateness Penalty, Desirability Premium: What Do More Certifications Actually Signal?

Inappropriateness Penalty, Desirability Premium: What Do More Certifications Actually Signal?
复制标题

不当处罚、期望溢价:更多认证实际上意味着什么?

DOI:
--
复制
发表时间:
2021
期刊:
Organization science (Providence, R.I.)
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Amol M. Joshi
Amol M. Joshi
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
Lauren Lanahan;D. Armanios;Amol M. Joshi

文献摘要

被引文献

相似文献

流行的理论认为,更多的认证可以提高绩效。然而,新出现的经验证据表明,获得更多的认证实际上可能会降低绩效。我们如何调和这种矛盾?实际上,鉴于这些最近发现的风险,企业为什么要寻求额外的认证?为了解决现有理论与最近经验之间的差距,我们更仔细地研究了企业在获得第一个认证后的活动和绩效结果。我们认为,不同的认证模式反映了不同的实验形式。特别是,企业可能愿意以不适当的惩罚方式进行实验,以便在实验成功后有机会获得随后的可取性溢价。不适当意味着认证标志着与公认的市场规范和标准的背离。可取性意味着认证标志着符合潜在受众自身利益的活动。我们假设,反映广泛实验的认证最初会招致不适当的惩罚,然而,当成功时,它们更有可能导致产生理想溢价的突破。我们通过对7440家美国企业样本的实证分析发现了这一观点的支持,这些企业获得了一项或多项小企业创新研究(SBIR)或小企业技术转让(STTR)资助,以将新技术商业化。这项研究推进了认证的制度理论,以更好地解释认证的好处和成本。
Prevailing theory argues that more certifications increase performance. However, emerging empirical evidence implies that obtaining more certifications may actually decrease performance. How do we reconcile this tension? Practically speaking, why would ventures seek additional certifications in light of these recently identified risks? To address this gap between existing theory and recent empirics, we look more closely at ventures’ activities and performance outcomes after they receive their first certification. We posit that different patterns of certification reflect different forms of experimentation. In particular, ventures may be willing to experiment in ways that incur an inappropriateness penalty for the chance to gain a subsequent desirability premium if their experiments succeed. Inappropriateness means that certifications signal divergence from accepted market norms and standards. Desirability means that certifications signal activities that are in the perceived self-interest of the potential audience. We hypothesize that certifications reflecting broad experimentation incur initial inappropriateness penalties, yet when successful, they are more likely to lead to breakthroughs that generate desirability premia. We find support for this idea through an empirical analysis drawing from a sample of 7,440 U.S. ventures that receive one or more Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) or Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) grants to commercialize new technologies. This study advances institutional theory of certification to better account not only for its benefits but also for its costs.