Wireless Attacks on Aircraft Instrument Landing Systems
Wireless Attacks on Aircraft Instrument Landing Systems
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发表时间：
2019
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通讯作者：
Harshad Sathaye;Domien Schepers;Aanjhan Ranganathan;G. Noubir
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作者：
Harshad Sathaye;Domien Schepers;Aanjhan Ranganathan;G. Noubir
现代飞机在通信、控制和导航方面严重依赖多种无线技术。研究人员展示了许多航空系统中的漏洞。然而，飞机着陆系统对敌方无线攻击的弹性尚未在公开文献中进行研究，尽管它们至关重要，而且低成本软件-defiNed Radio(特别提款权)平台的可用性越来越高。在本文中，我们研究和论证了飞机仪表着陆系统对无线攻击的脆弱性。我们分析了仪器着陆系统(ILS)的波形，并展示了使用商用SDR对此类无线电信号进行Spoofing的可行性，这会导致最后一刻的绕行决策，甚至在低能见度情况下错过着陆区。我们首次证明了完全和精确地控制航向偏差指示器是可能的，如ILS接收机所显示的那样，并在航空级ILS接收机上进行演示。我们分析了遮蔽攻击和低功率单音攻击的可能性。为了评估攻击的完备性，我们开发了一个严格控制的闭环ILS欺骗器。它根据飞机的GPS位置调整对手的发射信号，保持与对手目标位置一致的威力和偏差，导致未被发现的跑道外着陆。我们演示了对美国联邦航空局认证的fifl飞行模拟器(X-Plane)的集成攻击，该模拟器包含SPOOfiNG区域检测机制，该机制在进入着陆区时触发受控的SPOOfiNG以降低可检测性。我们系统地评估了对X-Plane基于AI的Au-Toland功能的攻击性能，并展示了18米到50米以上偏移触地得分的系统成功率。最后，我们讨论了实现安全和有效的飞机着陆系统的方法。fi
Modern aircraft heavily rely on several wireless technologies for communications, control, and navigation. Researchers demonstrated vulnerabilities in many aviation systems. However, the resilience of the aircraft landing systems to adversarial wireless attacks have not yet been studied in the open literature, despite their criticality and the increasing availability of low-cost software-defined radio (SDR) platforms. In this paper, we investigate and demonstrate the vulnerability of aircraft instrument landing systems to wireless attacks. We analyze the instrument landing sys-tem (ILS) waveforms’ and show the feasibility of spoofing such radio signals using commercially-available SDR, causing last-minute go around decisions, and even missing the landing zone in low-visibility scenarios. We first show that it is possible to fully and in fine-grain control the course deviation indicator, as displayed by the ILS receiver, in real-time , and demonstrate it on aviation-grade ILS receivers. We analyze the potential of both an overshadowing attack, and a lower-power single-tone attack. In order to evaluate the complete attack, we develop a tightly-controlled closed-loop ILS spoofer. It adjusts the adversary’s transmitted signals as a function of the aircraft GPS location, maintaining power and deviation consistent with the adversary’s target position, causing an undetected off-runway landing. We demonstrate the integrated attack on an FAA certified flight-simulator (X-Plane)incorporating a spoofing region detection mechanism, that triggers the controlled spoofing on entering the landing zone to reduce detectability. We systematically evaluate the performance of the attack against X-Plane’s AI-based au-toland feature, and demonstrate systematic success rate with offset touchdowns of 18 meters to over 50 meters. Finally, we discuss approaches towards secure and efficient aircraft landing systems