REGULATORY OPPORTUNISM: CROSS-NATIONAL PATTERNS IN NATIONAL BANKING REGULATORY RESPONSES FOLLOWING THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
REGULATORY OPPORTUNISM: CROSS-NATIONAL PATTERNS IN NATIONAL BANKING REGULATORY RESPONSES FOLLOWING THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
复制标题
监管机会主义：全球金融危机后国家银行监管应对措施的跨国模式
DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-9299.2012.02102.x
复制
发表时间：
2013
影响因子：
3.5
通讯作者：
Sung Ho Park
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Kevin A. Young;Sung Ho Park
各国对最近全球金融危机的监管对策差异很大。本文使用2009年至2012年30个不同经合组织国家的新数据来探讨这种变化。使用混合方法，采用模糊集定性比较分析和逻辑回归，我们测试了一些假设，在银行业的监管反应模式。我们的研究结果表明，虽然在金融危机期间的国家干预是一个重要的监管反应的必要条件，“金融化”，这里操作的金融部门在经济中的结构性主导地位，发挥着更重要的作用。我们表明，金融化既是一个充分条件，也是重大监管反应的良好预测因素，并指出了这种令人惊讶的模式的可能因果解释。
The variation in national regulatory responses to the recent global financial crisis has been considerable. This article explores this variation using new data on conditions in 30 different OECD countries between 2009 and 2012. Using a mixed-method approach which employs both fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis and logistic regression, we test a number of hypotheses regarding regulatory response patterns in the banking sector. Our findings suggest that while state intervention during the financial crisis was a necessary condition for a significant regulatory response, ‘financialization’, operationalized here as the structural dominance of the financial sector in the economy, plays a more important role. We show that financialization is both a sufficient condition and a good predictor of a significant regulatory response, and point to possible causal explanations for this surprising pattern.