Price Competition between International Airline Alliances
Price Competition between International Airline Alliances
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.607449
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发表时间：
2004-08
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
V. Bilotkach
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
V. Bilotkach
本文建立了两个国际航空公司联盟之间的价格竞争模型，消费者的偏好通过停留次数纵向区分。联盟使联运旅客受益。与古诺类型的设置相反，具有反垄断豁免权的联盟并不比没有反垄断豁免权的联盟更有利于联运乘客。虽然反垄断豁免导致联盟伙伴枢纽之间的直达旅行票价上涨，但授予这一豁免可能是必要的，以诱导航空公司之间的合并。建立具有反垄断豁免权的联盟与所提出的模式是一致的，尽管这样做可能会减少单个运营商的利润。
This paper develops a model of price competition between two international airline alliances, with consumers' preferences vertically differentiated by the number of stops. Alliances benefit the interline passengers. Alliances with antitrust immunity do not benefit interline passengers more than those without antitrust immunity, in contrast to the Cournot-type settings. While antitrust immunity leads to higher fares for non-stop travel between hubs of alliance partners, granting it might be necessary to induce consolidation between carriers. Formation of alliances with antitrust immunity is consistent with the proposed model, even though such is likely to decrease individual carriers' profit.