Modelling Defeasibility in Law: Logic or Procedure?
Modelling Defeasibility in Law: Logic or Procedure?
复制标题
法律中的可废止性建模：逻辑还是程序？
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2001
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
H. Prakken
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
H. Prakken
本文研究了当前的非单调逻辑是否适合于形式化法律的推理的可撤销性。它通过研究举证责任在法律的论证中的作用，特别是举证责任的分配如何决定反驳所需的力度来做到这一点。有人认为，目前可用的两种建模方法都有一些缺点。一方面，在非单调逻辑中模拟举证责任的技术不允许将举证责任从一方转移到另一方。另一方面，现行的法律的论证的程序模式过于僵化，因为每一个反驳都会导致举证责任的转移;这没有尊重在法律的推理中举证责任的转移只发生在某些情况下。然后，它表明如何目前的辩证模型的可废止推理可以适应克服这些缺点。
This paper investigates whether current nonmonotonic logics are suitable for formalising the defeasibility of legal reasoning. It does so by studying the role of burden of proof in legal argument, in particular how allocations of burden of proof determine the required strength of counterarguments. It is argued that the two currently available modelling approaches both have some shortcomings. On the one hand, techniques for modelling burden of proof in nonmonotonic logics do not allow for shifts of the burden of proof from one party to the other. On the other hand, current procedural models of legal argument are too rigid, in that every counterargument induces a shift of proof burdens; this fails to respect that in legal reasoning burden shifts only occur in some cases. It is then shown how current dialectical models of defeasible reasoning can be adapted to overcome these shortcomings.