Market power in renewable portfolio standards
Market power in renewable portfolio standards
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DOI：
10.1016/j.eneco.2013.05.004
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发表时间：
2013-09
期刊：
影响因子：
12.8
通讯作者：
Makoto Tanaka;Yihsu Chen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Makoto Tanaka;Yihsu Chen
可再生能源组合标准（RPS）要求可再生能源发电量占一定比例，已受到相当大的关注。一个新出现的问题是可再生能源证书/信贷（REC）市场的战略行为的可能性，以及其对电力市场的溢出效应。本文发展了占主导地位的企业竞争边缘模型，占市场势力。我们发现，市场势力可能会有显着的影响，REC和电力价格。特别是，当一个不可再生能源发电商是一个占主导地位的公司和一个可再生能源发电商是一个竞争的边缘，不可再生能源公司有很强的动机，以降低可再生能源价格，甚至为零，以避免可再生能源成本。零REC价格将抵消电力市场中的价格影响，从而减轻占主导地位的公司的市场势力。然而，从长远来看，这可能导致可再生能源投资不足，因为可再生能源以可再生能源形式获得的补贴消失了。因此，监管机构需要仔细监督市场表现，以确保可再生能源行业在RPS政策下健康发展。
Renewable portfolio standard (RPS), which requires a certain percentage of electricity production from renewables, has received considerable attention. One emerging issue is the possibility of strategic behavior in the renewable energy certificate/credit (REC) market, and its spillover effects on the electricity market. This paper develops dominant firm-competitive fringe models that account for market power. We show that market power could have significant impacts on the REC and power prices. In particular, when a nonrenewable generator is a dominant firm and a renewable generator is a competitive fringe, the nonrenewable firm has a strong incentive to lower the REC price, even to zero for avoiding REC costs. The zero REC price would negate price impacts in the power market, thereby mitigating market power of the dominant firm. However, this could lead to an underinvestment in renewables in the long run as subsidies received by renewables in form of RECs vanish. Therefore, regulatory agencies need to carefully oversee the market performance to ensure a healthy development of renewable industries under the RPS policies.