Optimizing Fund Allocation for Game-based Verifiable Computation Outsourcing
Optimizing Fund Allocation for Game-based Verifiable Computation Outsourcing
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DOI：
10.1007/978-3-030-99191-3_6
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发表时间：
2021-03
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Pinglan Liu;Xiaojuan Ma;Wensheng Zhang
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文献类型：
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作者：
Pinglan Liu;Xiaojuan Ma;Wensheng Zhang
本文考虑云服务器执行多个客户端提交的任务的设置。每个客户端都希望通过采用可信第三方（TTP）来验证概率来确保任务的诚实执行。云服务器为每个任务支付存款，每个客户端为每个提交的任务分配一个预算，并且每个方都有其有限的资金，我们研究如何最优地分配资金，使得：经济合理的云服务器诚实地计算每个任务;服务器的工资最大化;任务验证的延迟最小化。博弈论被应用到制定这些问题，并制定最佳解决方案。每个解决方案都通过严格的证明进行评估。据我们所知，这是第一个优化资金分配的工作，可验证的外包计算在一个服务器和多个客户端的设置，基于博弈论。
This paper considers the setting where a cloud server executes tasks submitted by multiple clients. Every client wishes to assure honest execution of the tasks by employing a trusted third party (TTP) to verify with a probability. The cloud server makes a deposit for each task it takes, each client allocates a budget for each task submitted, and every party has its limited fund. We study how to allocate the funds optimally such that: a economically-rational cloud server honestly computes each task; the server’s wage is maximized; the delay for task verification is minimized. Game theory is applied to formulate these problems, and optimal solutions are developed. Each solution is evaluated through rigorous proofs. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work on optimizing fund allocation for verifiable outsourcing of computation in the setting of one server and multiple clients, based on game theory.