The Economic Effects of Mandating Expanded Compensation Disclosures
The Economic Effects of Mandating Expanded Compensation Disclosures
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强制扩大薪酬披露的经济影响
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2514578
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Brandon Gipper
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Brandon Gipper
本文分析了授权扩张、管理层薪酬披露对薪酬水平、离散度和经理人离职的影响。为了说明，我使用了2006年薪酬讨论与分析（CD&A）的介绍，这是与薪酬相关的必要披露的重大扩展。该设计使用的引入日期的时间比较管理人员的薪酬在公司与不披露的差异中的差异分析。我发现有证据表明，披露与薪酬增加有关。我证实了这一发现与CD&A的部分回滚允许的跳跃我们的创业公司法案在2012年。CD&A的引入与薪酬分散度的增加有关，这与薪酬委员会灵活性的降低相一致，从而增加了经理人的支付风险。从横截面测试，补偿增加和营业额较高的管理人员任期较短，并在较小的公司，符合这些披露提高工作前景的鲜为人知的管理人员。根深蒂固和强大的管理者（首席执行官，首席财务官和执行董事）没有增加的薪酬与披露，不符合扩大披露，使租金提取。
This paper analyzes the effects of mandating expanded, management compensation disclosures on compensation levels, dispersion, and manager turnover. For identification, I use the introduction of the Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) in 2006, a significant expansion in the required disclosures related to compensation. The design uses the timing of the introduction date to compare manager pay at firms with and without the disclosure in a difference-in-differences analysis. I find evidence that disclosures are associated with increasing compensation. I corroborate this finding with the partial rollback of the CD&A allowed by the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act in 2012. The CD&A introduction is associated with increases in pay dispersion, consistent with reduced compensation committee flexibility that increases payout risk to managers. From cross-sectional tests, compensation increases and turnover are higher for managers with shorter tenure and at smaller firms, consistent with these disclosures enhancing the job prospects of lesser-known managers. Entrenched and powerful managers (CEOs, CFOs, and executive directors) do not have incremental pay increases with disclosures, inconsistent with expanded disclosures enabling rent extraction.