On narrow norms and vague heuristics: Reply
On narrow norms and vague heuristics: Reply
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DOI：
10.1037/0033-295x.103.3.592
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发表时间：
1996-07-01
影响因子：
5.4
通讯作者：
Gigerenzer, G
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Gigerenzer, G
这个答复澄清了 G. Gigerenzer（例如，1991、1994；Gigerenzer & Murray，1987）对统计推理的启发式和偏差方法的批评是关于什么的，而不是关于什么的。问题在于，强加了不必要的狭隘的合理推理规范，这些规范被用来诊断所谓的认知错觉，以及继续依赖模糊的启发法来解释一切，但又什么也解释不了。 D. Kahneman 和 A. Tversky (1996) 错误地断言 Gigerenzer 只是声称频率格式使所有认知错觉消失。相比之下，Gigerenzer 提出并测试了模型，这些模型可以实际预测频率判断何时有效、何时无效。问题不在于认知错觉是否消失，或者消失的频率如何。重点应该是构建认知过程的详细模型，以解释它们何时以及为何消失。后记是对 Kahneman 和 Tversky (1996) 后记的回应。
This reply clarifies what G. Gigerenzer's (e.g., 1991, 1994; Gigerenzer & Murray, 1987) critique of the heuristics-and-biases approach to statistical reasoning is and is not about. At issue is the imposition of unnecessarily narrow norms of sound reasoning that are used to diagnose so-called cognitive illusions and the continuing reliance on vague heuristics that explain everything and nothing. D. Kahneman and A. Tversky (1996) incorrectly asserted that Gigerenzer simply claimed that frequency formats make all cognitive illusions disappear. In contrast, Gigerenzer has proposed and tested models that actually predict when frequency judgments are valid and when they are not. The issue is not whether or not, or how often, cognitive illusions disappear. The focus should be rather the construction of detailed models of cognitive processes that explain when and why they disappear. A postscript responds to Kahneman and Tversky's (1996) postscript.