Kinship, Incentives, and Evolution
Kinship, Incentives, and Evolution
复制标题
DOI：
10.1257/aer.100.4.1725
复制
发表时间：
2010-09-01
影响因子：
10.7
通讯作者：
Weibull, Jorgen W.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Alger, Ingela;Weibull, Jorgen W.
我们分析家庭关系如何影响激励，重点关注两个相互利他的兄弟姐妹之间的战略互动。兄弟姐妹在不确定的情况下努力生产产出，并且他们可以将产出相互转移。对于同样利他的兄弟姐妹，他们的平衡努力在利他主义的共同程度上是非单调的，并且取决于环境的严酷程度。我们定义了兄弟姐妹利他主义程度的局部进化稳定性的概念，并表明该程度低于亲属关系因素。数值模拟显示了家庭关系如何随环境变化，以及这如何影响经济结果。 （JEL D13、D64、J12、Z13）
We analyze how family ties affect incentives, with focus on the strategic interaction between two mutually altruistic siblings. The siblings exert effort to produce output under uncertainty, and they may transfer output to each other. With equally altruistic siblings, their equilibrium effort is nonmonotonic in the common degree of altruism, and it depends on the harshness of the environment. We define a notion of local evolutionary stability of degrees of sibling altruism and show that this degree is lower than the kinship-relatedness factor. Numerical simulations show how family ties vary with the environment, and how this affects economic outcomes. (JEL D13, D64, J12, Z13)