Political Economy of Public Capital Formation in Japan
Political Economy of Public Capital Formation in Japan
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日本公共资本形成的政治经济学
DOI：
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发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Haruo Kondoh
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Haruo Kondoh
本文主要从政治经济学的角度考察了20世纪80年代以来的公共投资政策。本文的观点如下。首先，在宏观层面上，公共投资的短期波动可能不是为了抑制经济波动，而是受到执政党赢得选举的政治动机的控制。第二，在地区分配方面，到1993年自民党下台之前，自民党对公共投资分配的影响力一直很大，但在政权更迭之后，地方特殊利益集团的影响力可能会增强。以地方为中心，考虑政治经济因素的公共投资函数的实证分析表明，地方公共投资政策深受作为地方利益集团的建筑业的影响（建筑业对公共投资的依赖程度很高），公共投资的水平并没有按照中间选民定理的方式来决定。
This paper investigates public investment policy (mainly from the 1980s onwards) with a political-economic approach. The points of this paper are as follows. First, at the macro level, it is possible that the short-term fluctuation of public investment has been controlled by the government party's political incentive to win an election rather than in order to dampen economic fluctuations. Second, as for regional allocation, up to 1993 when the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (LDP) stepped down from government, the LDP had had a great influence on public investment allocation; however, following such a government alternation the influence of local special interest groups may have become stronger. Focusing on the local side, empirical analysis of the public investment function considering political-economic factors clarifies that local public investment policy has been deeply affected by the construction industry as a local interest group (which is heavily dependent on public investment in general), and that levels of public investment have not been determined in the way the median voter theorem implies.