Manipulative auction design
Manipulative auction design
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操纵性拍卖设计
DOI：
10.3982/te687
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发表时间：
2011
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
P. Jehiel
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
P. Jehiel
本文考虑了一个拍卖设计框架，在该框架中，投标人得到部分反馈的分布提交的投标在早期的拍卖：要么投标人是不对称的，但过去的出价被披露在一个匿名的方式或几个拍卖格式正在使用和分布的出价，但没有相关的格式，被披露。我采用基于类比的期望均衡（Jehiel 2005）来模拟这种情况。第一价格拍卖中，过去的出价是以匿名的方式披露产生更多的收入比第二价格拍卖，同时实现了有效的结果，在不对称的私人价值两个投标人的情况下，独立的分布。此外，通过使用几种拍卖格式与粗反馈，设计者总是可以提取更多的收入比迈尔森的最优拍卖，但收入比在完全信息的情况下，投标人享有事后退出权和分配和支付规则是单调的出价。这些结果表明，反馈披露作为一种新的工具，在机制设计的重要作用。
This paper considers an auction design framework in which bidders get partial feedback about the distribution of bids submitted in earlier auctions: either bidders are asymmetric but past bids are disclosed in an anonymous way or several auction formats are being used and the distribution of bids, but not the associated formats, is disclosed. I employ the analogy-based expectation equilibrium (Jehiel 2005) to model such situations. First-price auctions in which past bids are disclosed in an anonymous way generate more revenues than second-price auctions while achieving an efficient outcome in the asymmetric private values two-bidder case with independent distributions. Besides, by using several auction formats with coarse feedback, a designer can always extract more revenues than in Myerson's optimal auction, and yet less revenues than in the full information case whenever bidders enjoy ex post quitting rights and the assignment and payment rules are monotonic in bids. These results suggest an important role of feedback disclosure as a novel instrument in mechanism design.