Moral hazard versus liquidity and optimal unemployment insurance
Moral hazard versus liquidity and optimal unemployment insurance
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DOI：
10.1086/588585
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发表时间：
2008-04-01
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
Chetty, Raj
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Chetty, Raj
本文提出了失业保险福利影响搜索行为的新证据，并提出了一种利用该证据计算失业保险福利收益的简单方法。我的研究表明，失业救济金导致的失业持续时间增加的60%是由于“流动性效应”，而不是通过结合两种经验策略对寻找的边际激励(“道德风险”)的扭曲。首先，我发现福利的增加对流动性受限家庭的存续期影响要大得多。其次，一次性遣散费大大延长了受限制家庭的工期。我推导出了一个仅取决于简化形式的流动性和道德风险弹性的最优福利水平的公式。该公式意味着最优用户界面福利水平超过工资的50%。这里提出的福利分析的“精确识别”方法产生了稳健的最优政策结果，因为它不需要对原语进行结构性估计。
This paper presents new evidence on why unemployment insurance (UI) benefits affect search behavior and develops a simple method of calculating the welfare gains from UI using this evidence. I show that 60 percent of the increase in unemployment durations caused by UI benefits is due to a "liquidity effect" rather than distortions on marginal incentives to search ("moral hazard") by combining two empirical strategies. First, I find that increases in benefits have much larger effects on durations for liquidity-constrained households. Second, lump-sum severance payments increase durations substantially among constrained households. I derive a formula for the optimal benefit level that depends only on the reduced-form liquidity and moral hazard elasticities. The formula implies that the optimal UI benefit level exceeds 50 percent of the wage. The "exact identification" approach to welfare analysis proposed here yields robust optimal policy results because it does not require structural estimation of primitives.