Equilibrium is priceless: selfish task allocation for mobile crowdsourcing network
Equilibrium is priceless: selfish task allocation for mobile crowdsourcing network
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DOI:
10.1186/s13638-016-0668-3
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发表时间:
2016-07
影响因子:
2.6
通讯作者:
Qingyu Li;Panlong Yang;Shaojie Tang;Maotian Zhang;Xiaochen Fan
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Qingyu Li;Panlong Yang;Shaojie Tang;Maotian Zhang;Xiaochen Fan
Recent years have witnessed major innovations in mobile crowdsourcing networks. For selfish participants, conventional methods resort to incentive mechanism design for resource utilization, which might overlook the inherent equilibrium property among mobile users. In contrast to these proposals, we investigate the problem that whether or not the selfish users could be enabled to endorse stable task sharing with balanced allocations without incentive mechanism designs. Before making a positive answer to this problem, we need to address the following challenge, i.e., users have to make their balancing decisions with only very limited and dynamic local load information, which could possibly incur longer convergence time and imbalanced task allocations. In tackling this difficulty, we propose two distributed selfish load balancing schemes, themax-weight best responsepolicy forstrong informationscenario, where load information could be sufficiently collected; and theproportional allocationpolicy forweak informationscenario. We make experimental studies to validate proposed schemes. In our simulation study with real trace data, the proposed schemes converge fast in many typical settings with fairly good balancing performance. As for data traces from RollerNet (Tournoux et al., The accordion phenomenon 2009), the performance of load balancing and convergence property are further validated.