United Nations Bias and Force Commitments in Civil Conflicts
United Nations Bias and Force Commitments in Civil Conflicts
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联合国在国内冲突中的偏见和部队承诺
DOI：
10.1017/s0022381613001497
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Jacob D Kathman
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Michelle Benson;Jacob D Kathman
大量文献致力于确定联合国维持和平行动在结束内战方面的有效性。更少的工作试图提高我们对联合国对正在进行的冲突所作的部队一级承诺的理解。我们系统地处理联合国部队对国内冲突的承诺及其与冲突敌对行动的关系问题。具体而言，我们认为，联合国部队的部署是联合国安全理事会（安理会）偏袒或反对个别冲突派别和这些战斗人员的战场表现的产物。为了检验我们的论点，我们采用了新收集的数据，联合国安理会决议的偏见，每月维和人员的承诺，并在1991年至2008年期间非洲内部冲突的动态每月冲突条件。我们发现，联合国安理会决议中的偏见是联合国部队部署水平的一个重要决定因素，当它的首选方是持续较高的伤亡。这些调查结果对维持和平的效力具有重要影响。
A sizeable literature has been devoted to determining the effectiveness of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping in ending civil wars. Much less work has attempted to improve our understanding of the force-level commitments made by the UN to ongoing conflicts. We systematically address the issue of UN force commitments to civil conflicts and their relation to conflict hostility. Specifically, we posit that UN force deployments are a product of UN Security Council (UNSC) bias in favor of or against individual conflict factions and the battlefield performance of those combatants. To test our arguments, we employ newly collected data on UNSC resolution bias, monthly peacekeeping personnel commitments, and dynamic monthly-conflict conditions for African civil conflicts over the 1991–2008 period. We find that bias in UNSC resolutions is an important determinant of UN troop-deployment levels when its preferred side is sustaining higher casualties. These findings have important implications for peacekeeping effectiveness.