INDUSTRIAL POLICIES IN PRODUCTION NETWORKS
INDUSTRIAL POLICIES IN PRODUCTION NETWORKS
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DOI：
10.1093/qje/qjz024
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发表时间：
2019-11-01
影响因子：
13.7
通讯作者：
Liu, Ernest
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Liu, Ernest
许多发展中经济体采取有利于某些部门的产业政策。这种干预有经济逻辑吗？我分析的产业政策时，经济部门形成一个生产网络，通过投入产出联系。市场缺陷产生扭曲效应，通过后向需求联系而加剧，导致上游部门成为缺陷的汇，规模扭曲最大。我的主要发现是，部门规模的扭曲足以说明促进该部门的社会价值;因此，善意的政府有动机补贴上游部门。此外，部门干预的总效应可以简单地概括为一阶，通过我的充分统计和补贴支出之间的跨部门协方差。我的充分统计预测了20世纪70年代韩国和现代中国的部门政策，表明部门干预可能在这些经济体中产生了积极的总体效应。JEL代码：C67、O 11、O25、O 47。
Many developing economies adopt industrial policies favoring selected sectors. Is there an economic logic to this type of intervention? I analyze industrial policy when economic sectors form a production network via input-output linkages. Market imperfections generate distortionary effects that compound through backward demand linkages, causing upstream sectors to become the sink for imperfections and have the greatest size distortions. My key finding is that the distortion in sectoral size is a sufficient statistic for the social value of promoting that sector; thus, there is an incentive for a well-meaning government to subsidize upstream sectors. Furthermore, sectoral interventions' aggregate effects can be simply summarized, to first order, by the cross-sector covariance between my sufficient statistic and subsidy spending. My sufficient statistic predicts sectoral policies in South Korea in the 1970s and modern-day China, suggesting that sectoral interventions might have generated positive aggregate effects in these economies. JEL Codes: C67, O11, O25, O47.