Uncertainty about Uncertainty and Delay in Bargaining
Uncertainty about Uncertainty and Delay in Bargaining
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00565.x
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发表时间：
2002
期刊：
影响因子：
6.1
通讯作者：
Yossi Feinberg;Andrzej Skrzypacz
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Yossi Feinberg;Andrzej Skrzypacz
我们研究了一个单边议价博弈，在这个博弈中，买方拥有关于物品价值的私人信息，卖方拥有关于买方价值的私人信息。我们表明，这种不确定性的不确定性极大地改变了一套结果。特别是，二阶信念可能会导致延迟达成协议，即使卖方频繁提供。我们发现，并不是所有类型的二阶信念导致延迟。当买方在知道买方价值的情况下给卖方分配正概率时，延迟不仅可能发生，而且对于一类均衡它必然发生。然而，在所有其他情况下，延迟永远不会发生。版权所有2005年计量经济学会。
We study a one-sided offers bargaining game in which the buyer has private information about the value of the object and the seller has private information about his beliefs about the buyer's valuation. We show that this uncertainty about uncertainties dramatically changes the set of outcomes. In particular, second order beliefs can lead to a delay in reaching agreement even when the seller makes frequent offers. We show that not all types of second order beliefs lead to a delay. When the buyer assigns positive probability to the seller knowing the buyer's value, then delay not only can occur, but it must occur for a class of equilibria. However, in all other cases delay will never occur. Copyright The Econometric Society 2005.