Cognition and framing in sequential bargaining for gains and losses
Cognition and framing in sequential bargaining for gains and losses
复制标题
收益和损失的连续讨价还价中的认知和框架
DOI：
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发表时间：
1993
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Sankar Sen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Colin Camerer;Eric J. Johnson;T. Rymon;Sankar Sen
给出了序列议价的非合作博弈模型
Noncooperative game-theoretic models of sequential bargaining give an
underpinning to cooperative solution concepts derived from axioms, and
have proved useful in applications (see Osborne and Rubinstein 1990). But
experimental studies of sequential bargaining with discounting have generally
found systematic deviations between the offers people make and perfect
equilibrium offers derived from backward induction (e.g., Ochs and
Roth 1989).
We have extended this experimental literature in two ways. First,
we used a novel software system to record the information subjects
looked at while they bargained. Measuring patterns of information search
helped us draw inferences about how people think, testing as directly
as possible whether people use backward induction to compute offers.
Second, we compared bargaining over gains that shrink over time (because
of discounting) to equivalent bargaining over losses that expand over
time.
In the games we studied, two players bargain by making a finite number
of alternating offers. A unique subgame-perfect equilibrium can be computed
by backward induction. The induction begins in the last period and
works forward. Our experiments use a three-round game with a pie of
$5.00 and a 50-percent discount factor (so the pie shrinks to $2.50 and
$1.25 in the second and third rounds). In the perfect equilibrium the first
player offers the second player $1.25 and keeps $3.75.