Alternating continuous Prisoner's Dilemma
Alternating continuous Prisoner's Dilemma
复制标题
交替连续的囚徒困境
DOI：
10.1109/icsmc.2001.973096
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发表时间：
2001
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
H. Shishido
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Takamasa Shishido;H. Shishido
我们研究交替连续囚徒困境，其中玩家的下一个动作是一个玩家和对手的前一个动作的线性函数。当局中人与另一局中人采用相同的策略进行博弈时，得到了稳定均衡点存在的条件。我们模拟的情况下，球员可能偶尔会犯错误，与广泛的战略发挥对彼此。
We study the alternating continuous Prisoner's Dilemma in which the player's next move is a linear function of a player and the opponent's previous moves. The condition of existence of stable equilibrium points is obtained when a player plays a game against the other player with the same type of strategies. We simulate the case where the players may occasionally make mistakes with a wide range of strategies playing against each other.