Financial Institutions
Financial Institutions
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金融机构
DOI:
10.4324/9780429459450-13
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发表时间:
2019
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Dan Ariely
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Nizan Geslevich Packin;Dan Ariely
Despite considerable recent legislative attention to risk management such as the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, excessive risk-taking by financial institutions is still rampant. Decision-makers do not make risky decisions in a vacuum, but in an environment where multiple factors can influence their decisions. Such factors include cognitive-related biases and group-related biases. There are also tools, which have not yet been analyzed in the literature, that regulators can use to reduce undesirable or excessive risk-taking. Indeed, by shaping such environmental factors in which risk-related decisions in financial institutions are made, regulation can help actors make better, less risky choices. With the goal of helping reduce excessive risk-taking by financial institutions, this Article builds on an emerging focus in behavioral law and economics on prospects for “debiasing” actors through the structure of legal rules and policy. Accordingly, the Article suggests using behavioral economics-based legal guidelines to supplement the Dodd-Frank Act’s risk management provisions, specifically the requirement that financial institutions create separate risk committees. Behavioral economics-based legal guidelines would help reduce the degree of biased behavior that risk committees exhibit. The legal guidelines proposed in this Article focus on the composition, obligations, and work procedures of the financial institutions’ newly mandated risk committees. These guidelines provide behavioral incentives that will not only help reduce excessive risk-taking, but may even raise