Corruption, norms, and legal enforcement: Evidence from diplomatic parking tickets
Corruption, norms, and legal enforcement: Evidence from diplomatic parking tickets
复制标题
DOI：
10.1086/527495
复制
发表时间：
2007-12-01
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
Miguel, Edward
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Fisman, Raymond;Miguel, Edward
我们通过分析联合国官员在曼哈顿的停车行为来研究控制腐败的文化规范和法律的执行。直到2002年，外交豁免权保护联合国外交官免受停车执法行动的影响，因此外交官的行动仅受文化规范的约束。我们发现腐败规范的强烈影响：来自高腐败国家的外交官（基于现有的调查指数）积累了更多的未付停车违规。2002年，执法当局获得了没收违规者外交牌照的权利。作为回应，未支付的违规行为急剧减少。文化规范和（特别是在这方面）法律的执行都是腐败的重要决定因素。
We study cultural norms and legal enforcement in controlling corruption by analyzing the parking behavior of United Nations officials in Manhattan. Until 2002, diplomatic immunity protected UN diplomats from parking enforcement actions, so diplomats' actions were constrained by cultural norms alone. We find a strong effect of corruption norms: diplomats from high-corruption countries (on the basis of existing survey-based indices) accumulated significantly more unpaid parking violations. In 2002, enforcement authorities acquired the right to confiscate diplomatic license plates of violators. Unpaid violations dropped sharply in response. Cultural norms and (particularly in this context) legal enforcement are both important determinants of corruption.