Aggression, psychopathy and free will from a cognitive neuroscience perspective

Aggression, psychopathy and free will from a cognitive neuroscience perspective
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DOI:
10.1002/bsl.750
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发表时间:
2007-01-01
影响因子:
1.4
通讯作者:
Blair, R. J. R.
Blair, R. J. R.
中科院分区:
法学3区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Blair, R. J. R.

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本文在攻击性和精神变态研究的背景下考虑自由意志的概念。哲学文献被简略地认为是为了确定在什么假设下自由意志可以被认为是存在的。然而,由于自由意志的问题很难直接解决,本文的主要焦点是在哲学辩论中提出的问题,这些问题可能是经验性的,与对精神变态的理解有关。具体地说,研究考虑了以下问题:(1)自动加工和控制加工之间的区别;(2)与精神病患者的自动加工有关的损害;(3)与精神病患者的控制行为有关的损害。结论是,虽然自动和控制加工的二分法与反应性和工具性攻击的二分法之间没有直接的对应关系,但可以考虑一些重叠。因此,可以认为在没有自由意志的情况下,可以认为发生了某些反作用力事件。然而,至少从兼容主义者的角度来看,工具性侵略必须涉及自由意志。2007年由John Wiley&Sons,Ltd.出版。
This article considers the notion of free will in the context of aggression and psychopathy research. The philosophical literature is very briefly considered to determine under what assumptions free will can be considered to exist. However, as the issue of free will is very difficult to address directly, the prime focus of this article is on issues raised in the philosophical debate, that may be empirically tractable and that are relevant to the understanding of psychopathy. Specifically, the following issues are considered: (1) The distinction between automatic and controlled processing; (2) Impairment related to automatic processing in individuals with psychopathy; and (3) Impairment related to controlled behavior in individuals with psychopathy. It is concluded that, while there is not a direct mapping of the automatic versus controlled processing dichotomy on to the reactive versus instrumental aggression dichotomy, some overlap can be considered. As such, it is possible to consider that certain episodes of reactive aggression might be considered to occur in the absence of free will. However, instrumental aggression, at least from a compatibilist perspective, must involve free will. Published in 2007 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.