Does greater bank competition increase third-party guarantee loan default rates? evidence from U.S. interstate branching deregulation
Does greater bank competition increase third-party guarantee loan default rates? evidence from U.S. interstate branching deregulation
复制标题
银行竞争加剧是否会增加第三方担保贷款违约率？
DOI：
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发表时间：
2021
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Pankaj C. Patel
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Pankaj C. Patel
摘要 利用允许各州对分支机构扩张设置障碍的州际分支机构限制法，我们测试了银行间竞争的加剧是否会增加第三方贷款担保人的风险承担（以更高的贷款违约率为代表）。我们发现，来自限制性较高（竞争较低）的州的小企业管理局 (SBA) 贷款违约的可能性较小，至少降低了 4%。研究结果对于各种证伪测试都是稳健的。证实向 SBA 转移的风险增加，限制较少的州的银行面临着更激烈的竞争：增加 SBA 贷款金额和贷款期限以及贷款学习（当前贷款之前的累计贷款量）并没有影响当前贷款违约的可能性。与事实相反，在限制性更强的州，批准金额较高、期限较长的贷款违约的可能性较小。
ABSTRACT Exploiting the interstate branching restrictiveness law that allowed states to erect barriers to branch expansion, we test whether increased interbank competition increases risk-bearing, proxied by higher loan default, for third-party loan guarantors. We find that Small Business Administration (SBA) loans from states with higher restrictiveness (lower competition) are less likely to default, by at least four percent. The findings are robust to a variety of falsification tests. Confirming increased risk transfer to SBA, banks in less restrictive states facing increased competition: increased both SBA loan amount and duration of the loan and the learning-by-loaning (cumulative loan volume before the current loan) did not affect the likelihood of default of the current loan. Counterfactually, loans of higher approval amount and longer duration were less likely to default in more restrictive states.
影响因子：
8
作者：
Brown, J. David;Earle, John S.
通讯作者：
Earle, John S.