A Market‐Based Environmental Policy Experiment in Chile*
A Market‐Based Environmental Policy Experiment in Chile*
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智利基于市场的环境政策实验*
DOI：
10.1086/324657
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发表时间：
2002
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
R. Katz
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Montero;José Miguel Sánchez;R. Katz
本文以智利圣地亚哥的颗粒物控制项目为基础，对一个欠发达国家的环境市场的绩效进行了评估。我们发现，祖父的许可证创造了经济激励现任源更容易宣布他们的（历史）排放量，以要求任何许可证。此外，由于交易成本、监管不确定性和执法不完善，市场尚未充分发展。尽管如此，它为来源提供了适应新的市场条件的灵活性。我们对这一特殊经验的分析表明，即使在机构能力有限的情况下，基于市场的政策也可以比传统的命令和控制政策提供重要优势。
We evaluate the performance of an environmental market in a less developed country on the basis of the experiences of the particulate matter control program of Santiago, Chile. We find that grandfathering the permits has created economic incentives for incumbent sources to more readily declare their (historic) emissions in order to claim any permits. In addition, the market has not fully developed because of transaction costs, regulatory uncertainty, and incomplete enforcement. Nonetheless, it has provided sources with the flexibility to adapt to new market conditions. Our analysis of this particular experience indicates that market‐based policies can provide important advantages over traditional command‐and‐control policies even under limited institutional capabilities.