Dumping as a signal of innovation
Dumping as a signal of innovation
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倾销是创新的信号
DOI：
10.1016/j.jinteco.2006.01.002
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发表时间：
2007
影响因子：
3.3
通讯作者：
Yuka Ohno
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Kaz Miyagiwa;Yuka Ohno
在技术变化迅速的研发密集型行业，创新型外国公司可能需要出口比正常数量更多的产品，以表明其拥有的新技术的水平。我们发现，如果外国公司在创新方面的声誉相对较差，折扣率足够高，或者拥有显著降低成本的新技术，这种行为会导致低于成本的销售。我们还表明，反倾销降低了信号成本，使本国企业受益，并可能在关税前期间提高对外国企业的利润。
In the R&D-intensive industries, where technologies change rapidly, an innovative foreign firm may need to export greater than normal quantities to signal the level of the new technology it possesses. We find that such actions lead to sales below cost if the foreign firm has a relatively poor reputation for innovation, has a sufficiently high discount factor or possesses a new technology that significantly cuts its cost. We also show that antidumping reduces the costs of signaling, benefits the home firm, and may raise the profit to the foreign firm in the pre-duty period.