Implementation with Evidence
Implementation with Evidence
复制标题
有证据的实施
DOI：
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发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Olivier Tercieux
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Navin Kartik;Olivier Tercieux
我们通过允许代理自愿提供歧视性信号（即证据）来推广纳什实现的规范问题。证据可以采取硬信息的形式，或者更一般地说，在不同的州有不同但非禁禁性的成本。在这样的环境中，可以实现非马斯金单调的社会选择函数。我们提出了一个更一般的性质，证据单调性，并证明这是实现的必要条件。证据的单调性也足以在经济环境中实现。在某些情况下，比如当代理人对诚实有较小的偏好时，任何社会选择函数都是单调的。获得了更多的特征以作为确凿的证据。我们讨论了实施问题（证据提供是自愿的）和假设问题（证据可以由规划者选择作为扩展结果空间的一部分）之间的关系。
We generalize the canonical problem of Nash implementation by allowing agents to voluntarily provide discriminatory signals, i.e., evidence. Evidence can either take the form of hard information or, more generally, have differential but nonprohibitive costs in different states. In such environments, social choice functions that are not Maskin-monotonic can be implemented. We formulate a more general property, evidence monotonicity, and show that this is a necessary condition for implementation. Evidence monotonicity is also sufficient for implementation in economic environments. In some settings, such as when agents have small preferences for honesty, any social choice function is evidence-monotonic. Additional characterizations are obtained for hard evidence. We discuss the relationship between the implementation problem where evidence provision is voluntary and a hypothetical problem where evidence can be chosen by the planner as part of an extended outcome space.