Identity and the economics of organizations
Identity and the economics of organizations
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DOI：
10.1257/0895330053147930
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发表时间：
2005-12-01
影响因子：
8.4
通讯作者：
Kranton, RE
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Akerlof, GA;Kranton, RE
组织的经济学充满了激励员工的金钱奖励和惩罚的陷阱。如果经济刺激不起作用，那什么能起作用呢？本文提出，工人的自我形象作为从业人员，加上他们的理想，他们的工作应该如何做，可以是一个主要的工作激励。它展示了这样的身份如何可以扁平化奖励计划，因为它们解决了“委托代理”问题。本文还确定和探讨了一个新的权衡：主管可能会提供信息的校长，但在劳动力中造成裂痕，并减少员工的内在工作激励。我们从军事和民间组织的经典社会学的例子激励理论。
The economics of organizations is replete with the pitfalls of monetary rewards and punishments to motivate workers. If economic incentives do not work, what does? This paper proposes that workers' self-image as jobholders, coupled with their ideal as to how their job should be done, can be a major work incentive. It shows how such identities can flatten reward schedules, as they solve "principal-agent" problem. The paper also identifies and explores a new tradeoff: supervisors may provide information to principals, but create rifts within the workforce and reduce employees' intrinsic work incentives. We motivate the theory with examples from the classic sociology of military and civilian organizations.