An Economic Model of Welfare Stigma
An Economic Model of Welfare Stigma
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福利耻辱的经济模型
DOI：
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发表时间：
1983
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
R. Moffitt
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
R. Moffitt
也许消费者需求经济理论最基本的假设是“多总比少好”。事实上，消费者理论的所有主要命题在某种意义上都可以源自“商品是好的”这一假设。然而有趣的是，低收入人群中许多人的行为似乎违反了这一原则，因为许多人原来有资格获得积极的福利，但实际上并没有加入福利名单。例如，据估计，1970 年，只有大约 69% 的符合 AFDC（对有受抚养子女的家庭的援助）资格的家庭参与了该计划（见 Richard Michel，1980）。 AFDC-U（有失业男性的家庭有资格参与该计划）的相应百分比仅为 43%，而食品券计划的参与率仅为 38%（见 Maurice McDonald，1977 年）。这种现象让许多调查人员感到困惑，因为这些人并不在他们的预算范围内。因此，大多数研究者在研究福利计划对行为的影响时忽略了这个问题。在本文中，这种对收入增加看似非理性的拒绝被建模为福利耻辱的结果，即参与福利计划本身所产生的负效用。1耻辱的存在已在社会学文献中得到充分记录（Patrick Horan 和 Patricia Austin，1974；Lee Rainwater，1979），其中对接受者的采访经常揭示缺乏自尊和“消极自我描述”的感觉。来自参与福利。然而，这种现象尚未被建模，因此仍然存在许多问题。什么时候参与的负效用强到足以阻止参与？难道我们不应该期望个人在做出决定时权衡参与的弊端和潜在的好处吗？相对于潜在利益的参与弹性是多少？另外，稍微不同的是，耻辱如何影响福利的工作积极性？这些问题很少受到经济学家的关注，但它们对于我们预测各种福利计划对低收入人口的影响的能力至关重要。在这里，这些问题通过将不参与建模为效用最大化决策来解决。该模型是为 AFDC 计划开发和估算的。2 该模型假设个人效用函数不仅包含可支配收入，还包含
Perhaps the most basic assumption of the economic theory of consumer demand is that "more is better than less." Virtually all of the major propositions of consumer theory can, in a certain sense, be derived from the assumption that "goods are good." Interestingly, however, this tenet seems to be violated by the behavior of many individuals in the low-income population, for many turn out to be eligible for a positive welfare benefit but do not in fact join the welfare rolls. For example, it has been estimated that in 1970, only about 69 percent of the families eligible for AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) participated in the program (see Richard Michel, 1980). The corresponding percentage for AFDC-U, the program for which families with an unemployed male are eligible, was only 43 percent and the participation rate in the Food Stamp Program was only 38 percent (see Maurice McDonald, 1977). This phenomenon has puzzled many investigators because such individuals do not locate on the boundaries of their budget sets. Consequently, most investigators ignore the problem when studying the effects of welfare programs on behavior. In this paper, this seemingly irrational rejection of an increase in income is modeled as resulting from welfare stigma -that is, from disutility arising from participation in a welfare program per se.1 The existence of stigma has been amply documented in the sociological literature (Patrick Horan and Patricia Austin, 1974; Lee Rainwater, 1979), where interviews of recipients have often uncovered feelings of lack of self-respect and " negative self-characterizations" from participation in welfare. Nevertheless, this phenomenon has not been modeled, and many questions consequently remain. When is the disutility of participation strong enough to prevent participation? Shouldn't we expect individuals to weigh the disutility of participation against the potential benefit in their decisions? What is the elasticity of participation with respect to the potential benefit? Also, in a slightly different vein, how are the work disincentives of welfare affected by stigma? These questions have been given scant attention by economists, yet they are crucial for our ability to predict the impact of various welfare programs on the lowincome population. Here these questions are addressed by modeling nonparticipation as a utility-maximizing decision. The model is developed and estimated for the AFDC program.2 The model posits an individual utility function containing not just disposable income, but