Sterilised central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market
Sterilised central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market
复制标题
央行对外汇市场的冲销干预
DOI：
10.1016/s0022-1996(98)00065-8
复制
发表时间：
1999
影响因子：
3.3
通讯作者：
Paolo Vitale
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Paolo Vitale
我们已经研究了冲销外汇干预的信号作用，使用市场微观结构框架。我们假设货币当局干预外汇市场，以瞄准外币的价值。由于外汇的基本面不一定与这一目标一致，中央银行没有动机披露其干预行动，任何有关其活动的公告都是不可信的。在这种情况下，秘密冲销干预可以用来影响代理人的预期和汇率，因为中央银行拥有关于这些基本面的私人信息。我们分析的一个令人惊讶的结果是，虽然关于干预目标的宣布不可信，但它们甚至不可取。事实上，当这个目标是秘密的时候，外汇市场比当它是众所周知的时候更有效率，因为在前一种情况下，中央银行更积极，披露更多的私人信息。
We have studied the signalling role of sterilised foreign exchange intervention using a market micro-structure framework. We have assumed that the monetary authorities intervene in the foreign exchange market in order to target the value of a foreign currency. Since the fundamentals of the foreign currency are not necessarily equal to this objective, the central bank does not have an incentive to reveal its intervention operations and no announcement on its activity will be credible. Under these circumstances, secret sterilised intervention can be used to influences agents' expectations and exchange rates, as the central bank possesses private information on these fundamentals. A surprising result of our analysis is that while announcements on the objective of intervention are not credible, they are not even desirable. In fact, the foreign exchange market is more efficient when this objective is secret than when it is common knowledge, because in the former case the central bank is more aggressive and reveals more of its private information.
影响因子：
6.1
作者：
CUKIERMAN, A;MELTZER, AH
通讯作者：
MELTZER, AH