Developing Online Double Auction Mechanism for Fishery Markets
Developing Online Double Auction Mechanism for Fishery Markets
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发展水产市场网上双重拍卖机制
DOI：
10.1007/978-3-642-38577-3_1
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Kazuo Miyashita
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Kazuo Miyashita;Kazuo Miyashita
在鱼类现货交易市场中，单边拍卖以其快速、简单的特点被用于市场出清，这在处理易腐货物时非常重要。然而，在这些拍卖中，卖方不能参与定价过程。一个标准的双向拍卖市场收集交易者的出价，并匹配买家的更高出价和卖家的更低出价，以找到最有效的分配，假设未售出物品的价值保持不变。然而，在现货鱼市场上，当卖方无法出售因易腐而失去残值的鱼时，他们会遭受损失。为了解决这个问题，我们研究了一个合适的设计，在渔业市场的网上双向拍卖，出价到达动态与他们的时间限制。我们的市场机制旨在通过减少交易失败来提高交易者的盈利能力，以应对不确定的进入/离开出价。我们开发了一个启发式的匹配规则，为市场的交易者的出价优先级的基础上，他们的时间关键性和经验评估其性能。
In spot markets for trading fishes, single-sided auctions are used for clearing the market by virtue of its promptness and simplicity, which are important in dealing with perishable goods. However, in those auctions, sellers cannot participate in price-making process. A standard double auction market collects bids from traders and matches buyers’ higher bids and sellers’ lower bids to find the most efficient allocation, assuming that values of unsold items remain unchanged. Nevertheless, in the spot fish market, sellers suffer loss when they fail to sell the fish, whose salvage value is lost due to perishability. To solve the problem, we investigate the suitable design of an online double auction for fishery markets, where bids arrive dynamically with their time limits. Our market mechanism aims at improving traders’ profitability by reducing trade failures in the face of uncertainty of incoming/leaving bids. We developed a heuristic matching rule for the market to prioritize traders’ bids based on their time-criticality and evaluated its performance empirically.