Optimal signaling with cheap talk and money burning
Optimal signaling with cheap talk and money burning
复制标题
通过廉价的谈话和烧钱实现最佳信号传递
DOI：
10.1007/s00182-016-0558-2
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发表时间：
2017
影响因子：
0.6
通讯作者：
B. Visser
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
V. Karamychev;B. Visser
我们研究了发送者最优信号均衡与廉价的谈话和烧钱。在一般的假设下，联邦调查局从不使用烧钱来揭示所有的州，但总是希望至少对某些州的信息进行篡改。随着二次偏好和任何对数凹密度的状态，最佳通信是乱码为所有状态：烧钱，如果使用，是用来调整池的间隔。这是通过深入研究著名的均匀二次的情况下说明。我们还展示了“措手不及”成本的存在如何导致接收者效用函数的常见假设发生微小变化，从而通过烧钱的发送者最优策略充分揭示这一点。
We study Sender-optimal signaling equilibria with cheap talk and money-burning. Under general assumptions, the Sender never uses money-burning to reveal all states, but always wants to garble information for at leastsomestates. With quadratic preferences and any log-concave density of the states, optimal communication is garbled forallstates: money-burning, if used at all, is used to adjust pooling intervals. This is illustrated by studying in depth the well-known uniform-quadratic case. We also show how the presence of a cost of being “caught unprepared” that gives rise to a small change in a common assumption on the Receiver’s utility function makes full revelation through money-burning Sender-optimal.