A Survey of Executive Compensation Contracts in China's Listed Companies
A Survey of Executive Compensation Contracts in China's Listed Companies
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DOI：
10.1016/j.cjar.2013.06.001
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发表时间：
2013-09
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Yubo Li;Fang Lou;Jiwei Wang;Hongqi Yuan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Yubo Li;Fang Lou;Jiwei Wang;Hongqi Yuan
本文对228家上市公司自愿披露的高管薪酬合同进行了分析，发现中央政府控股的公司在高管薪酬合同中披露的信息多于地方政府控股和非政府控股的公司。现金支付是高管薪酬的主要形式，而股权支付在中国上市公司中很少使用。平均而言，在高管薪酬合同中，基本工资和基于绩效的薪酬的价值没有显著差异。但是，与非政府控股公司的高管相比，政府控股公司的高管获得了更多的激励性薪酬。会计盈余通常用于高管薪酬合同，很少有公司使用股票回报来评估其高管。然而，自2007年以来，非金融措施的使用大幅增加。
We analyze 228 executive compensation contracts voluntarily disclosed by Chinese listed firms and find that central-government-controlled companies disclose more information in executive compensation contracts than local-government-controlled and non-government-controlled companies. Cash-based payments are the main form of executive compensation, whereas equity-based payments are seldom used by Chinese listed companies. On average, there are no significant differences in the value of basic salaries and performance-based compensation in executive compensation contracts. But, compared with their counterparts in non-government-controlled companies, executives in government-controlled companies are given more incentive compensation. Accounting earnings are typically used in executive compensation contracts, with few firms using stock returns to evaluate their executives. However, the use of non-financial measures has increased significantly since 2007.