The locked-in syndrome and the behaviorist epistemology of other minds
The locked-in syndrome and the behaviorist epistemology of other minds
复制标题
锁定综合症和其他思想的行为主义认识论
DOI：
10.1007/bf02134779
复制
发表时间：
1991
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
B. M. Reuter
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Kurthen;D. Moskopp;D. Linke;B. M. Reuter
在本文中，神经重症监护医学中对患者的正确意识归属问题作为一般哲学“其他思想问题”的一个特例进行了探讨。有人认为，尽管意识和昏迷的临床归因大多基于行为证据，但其他思想的行为主义认识论不太可能成功。为了说明这一点，所谓的“完全锁定综合症”被视为行为主义的试金石，其中意识保留，但由于下腹侧脑干病变而导致运动能力完全丧失。有人认为，这个没有行为表达的意识的例子并没有具体反驳行为主义，而是说明了对其他心灵的非验证主义理论的需要。有人进一步认为，这种理论的民间版本已经成为我们在临床背景下对意识的事实归属的基础。最后，概述了针对完全锁定综合征患者的非行为主义他人思想理论。
In this paper, the problem of correct ascriptions of consciousness to patients in neurological intensive care medicine is explored as a special case of the general philosophical ‘other minds problem’. It is argued that although clinical ascriptions of consciousness and coma are mostly based on behavioral evidence, a behaviorist epistemology of other minds is not likely to succeed. To illustrate this, the so-called ‘total locked-in syndrome’, in which preserved consciousness is combined with a total loss of motor abilities due to a lower ventral brain stem lesion, is presented as a touchstone for behaviorism. It is argued that this example of consciousness without behavioral expression does not disprove behaviorism specifically, but rather illustrates the need for a non-verificationist theory of other minds. It is further argued that a folk version of such a theory already underlies our factual ascriptions of consciousness in clinical contexts. Finally, a non-behaviorist theory of other minds for patients with total locked-in syndrome is outlined.