On the Allegedly Invisible Dutch Construction Sector Cartel
On the Allegedly Invisible Dutch Construction Sector Cartel
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DOI：
10.1093/joclec/nhm021
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发表时间：
2007-10
影响因子：
1.5
通讯作者：
P. Bergeijk
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
P. Bergeijk
本文考虑了荷兰建筑业市场的广泛卡特尔污染。在486份提交了完整秘密账户的宽大申请中，获得了该行业操纵投标的压倒性法律证据。我提供了一个案例研究和一个基础广泛的方法事后分析，这些方法早前被用于发现荷兰市场的故障，但未能发现建筑行业的问题。结论是，这些研究存在严重缺陷。理论和实证经济取证（如果应用得当）为反垄断当局直接发现反垄断违法行为创造了价值，或者通过告知他们在哪里寻找直接证据。
This paper considers an extensive cartel contamination of markets in the Dutch construction sector. Overwhelming legal evidence of bid rigging in this sector was obtained in 486 leniency applications in which complete secret accounts were submitted. I offer a case study and a broadly based post mortem of methodologies that were applied earlier to detect malfunctioning markets in the Netherlands, but failed to identify the construction sector as problematic. It is concluded that these studies were seriously flawed. Theoretical and empirical economic forensics (if properly applied) creates value for antitrust authorities in detection of antitrust violations directly, or by informing them where to look for direct evidence.