Doxastic Decisions, Epistemic Justification, and The Logic of Agency
Doxastic Decisions, Epistemic Justification, and The Logic of Agency
复制标题
信念决策、认知论证和能动性逻辑
DOI：
10.1007/s11098-005-4063-x
复制
发表时间：
2006
影响因子：
1.3
通讯作者：
H. Wansing
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
H. Wansing
主流认识论中的一个突出问题是关于道教义务和道教意志论的争论。本文认为，这种讨论可以得益于与形式认识论的联系，即信仰、代理和义务的组合模态逻辑。提出了一种基于统计理论的道义道义逻辑的语义学，并认为这对于处理主流认识论中所提到的复杂而重要的问题是有帮助和启发的。此外，有人认为，这种联系是互惠互利的。道克斯主义唯意志论的讨论将道克斯主义逻辑学家的注意力引向了信仰形成的概念，并因此关注了信仰的动态方面，这些方面迄今一直被忽视。对于信仰形成归属的形式语言和语义学的发展可能有助于澄清意志论主张的内容和含义。例如，一个关于其他作用者筑巢的简单观察，可能有助于解释建立信念和为他人的信念负责的概念。通过这种方式，统计理论可以成为主流认识论和形式认识论之间的桥梁。
A prominent issue in mainstream epistemology is the controversy about doxastic obligations and doxastic voluntarism. In the present paper it is argued that this discussion can benefit from forging links with formal epistemology, namely the combined modal logic of belief, agency, and obligation. A stit-theory-based semantics for deontic doxastic logic is suggested, and it is claimed that this is helpful and illuminating in dealing with the mentioned intricate and important problems from mainstream epistemology. Moreover, it is argued that this linking is of mutual benefit. The discussion of doxastic voluntarism directs the attention of doxastic logicians to the notion of belief formation and thus to dynamic aspects of beliefs that have hitherto been neglected. The development of a formal language and semantics for ascriptions of belief formation may contribute to clarifying the contents and the implications of voluntaristic claims. A simple observation concerning other-agent nestings of stit-operators, for instance, may help illuminating the notions of making belief and responsibility for beliefs of others. In this way, stit-theory may serve as a bridge between mainstream and formal epistemology.