How should we define goodness? Reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
How should we define goodness? Reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jtbi.2004.06.005
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发表时间：
2004-11-07
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
Iwasa, Y
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ohtsuki, H;Iwasa, Y
间接互惠理论对于解释人类之间的合作很重要。由于社会交往的伴侣经常发生变化，个人应该利用声誉等社会信息来评估他的伴侣，并决定是否帮助他。对于那些拥有“良好”社会声誉的人，玩家会给予援助作为回报，而对于那些拥有“坏”声誉的人，他必须拒绝帮助。否则利他主义的好处很容易被他们利用。然而，人们对声誉中“善良”的定义知之甚少。什么样的行为是并且应该被视为善行，什么样的行为是恶行？什么样的善行能够维持利他主义的交换？我们在此从进化的角度挑战这个问题。我们将社会声誉概括为“荣誉分数”（H 分数），并研究群体中的个体基于间接互惠稳定维持合作关系的条件。我们详尽地研究了 4096 种可能情况下进化稳定策略 (ESS) 的条件。数学分析表明，只有八种被称为“前八”的情况对间接互惠的演化至关重要。前八名中的每一个人都有两个共同的特点：（一）与好人合作被认为是好的，背叛他们被认为是坏的；（二）背叛坏人应该被视为良好行为，因为它具有制裁作用。我们的结果从进化的角度为善的定义提供了一种解决方案。此外，我们认为，声誉动态的形式主义为动物社会中社会信息的生成、处理和传播方式提供了一般性的见解。 (C) 2004 Elsevier Ltd. 保留所有权利。
Theory of indirect reciprocity is important in explaining cooperation between humans. Since a partner of a social interaction often changes, an individual should assess his partner by using social information such as reputation and make decisions whether to help him or not. To those who have 'good' social reputation does a player give aid as reciprocation, whereas he has to refuse to help those who have 'bad' reputation. Otherwise benefits of altruism is easily exploited by them. Little has been known, however, about the definition of 'goodness' in reputation. What kind of actions are and should be regarded as good and what kind of actions bad? And what sort of goodness enables sustaining exchange of altruism? We herein challenge this question with an evolutionary perspective. We generalize social reputation as 'Honor-score' (H-score) and examine the conditions under which individuals in a group stably maintain cooperative relationships based on indirect reciprocity. We examine the condition for evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) over 4096 possible cases exhaustively. Mathematical analysis reveals that only eight cases called 'leading eight' are crucial to the evolution of indirect reciprocity. Each in the leading eight shares two common characteristics: (i) cooperation with good persons is regarded as good while defection against them is regarded as bad, and (ii) defection against bad persons should be regarded as a good behavior because it works as sanction. Our results give one solution to the definition of goodness from an evolutionary viewpoint. In addition, we believe that the formalism of reputation dynamics gives general insights into the way social information is generated, handled, and transmitted in animal societies. (C) 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.